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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE.
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILcox.
ABDUCTION.
State v. Wood, La., 67 So. 542. To another State. Defendant was convicted
under a statute making it a crime to abduct or entice any woman of previous chaste
character for the purpose of prostitution. The evidence showed that the defendant
induced the prosecutrix to leave her home in Louisiana, and go to Texas. That
the defendant procured a marriage license but the Catholic priest refused to perform
the ceremony during Lent. The defendant offered to be married by a justice of the
peace. The prosecutrix refused this offer but cohabited with defendant. Defendant
objected to the introduction of evidence as to certain promises made in Texas, but
the evidence was received. Defendant contented that the verdict was not supported
by the evidence and claimed that the crime charged was now within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Government. As some other promises were made in
Louisiana, before the prosecutrix went to Texas, the crime was complete in that
state, and the evidence of subsequent happenings in Texas was admissible to show
the purpose for which the prosecutrix was enticed from Louisiana. Hence the
evidence was properly admitted. While the trial court might have set the verdict
aside on the ground that the defendant's guilt was not established beyond a reasonable
doubt, the appellate court could not do so as the constitution of the state limits its
jurisdiction to questions of law alone. Whether the verdict of the jury is supported
by the evidence is a question of fact. The federal law is not in conflict with the
state law, and in so far as they might be directed against the same evils they are
easily reconciled.. Hence the conviction was affirmed.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
State v. Schutte, 93 Atl., 112 N. J. Assault with an automobile. A criminal
assault may be committed with an automobile driven along a piublic street at an
excessive rate of speed that endangers the safety of other persons and actually
results in such injury. The driving of an automobile at an excessive rate of speed
is a willful act likely to inflict injury from which malice and intention to inflict
injury, which are the essentials of a criminal assault, may, if the circumstances so
warrant, be implied.
CHANGE OF VENUE (FROM JOHN LISLE).
Commonwealth v. March, 248 Pa., 434, A. R. 28 May, 1915. Change of venue
is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court and when the application is
refused an appellate court will only interfere where the facts disclose an abuse of
discretion.
Where a petition for a change of venue was filed and there was an argument of
counsel thereon but no facts were proved to show the court that the accused could
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not have a fair and impartial trial in the jurisdiction where the crime was committed,
and there was nothing to show the existence of such passion or prejudice as would
prevent the jury from rendering a true verdict under the evidence, the petition
was properly refusea.
It is not error for the court to permit a defendant to be tried upon one indictment
because another indictment, found by a previous grand jury for the same offense,
is undisposed of at the time of the trial.
The action of the trial judge in refusing to sustain challenges of jurors for cause
will be reversed only in case of palpable error.
In a homicide case where the defendant objects to the competency of a certain
witness on the ground that she was his wife, which she denied, an assignment of
error based on the fact that certain witnesses identified another woman present ia
the court room as the wife of the defendant will be disregarded where no objections
were made to the questions when asked such witnesses, and no exceptions were taken
to the rulings of the trial judge in this respect, and especially where it appeared that
no harm was done the defendant by such identification.
In such case it was not error for the court to permit such witness to testify,
when it appeared that the lawful wife of the defendant was living, and that the witness
was not at the time of the trial nor at any other time his wife. The question of the
competency of such witness was for the trial judge and where he submitted it to the
jury as a question of fact, thus giving the defendant the benefit of whatever doubt
there might have been in the mind of the jurors as to his marriage relations, the
defendant could have no cause of complaint.
Where the record on appeal in a homicide case showed that every step taken in
the presentation and trial of the defendant was in the Court of Oyer and Terminer,
but by a clerical error the docket entries showed a certification from the Oyer and
Terminer to the Quarter Sessions, it was not error for the lower court to amend the
record in accordance with the facts.
COMPLAINT.
State v. Flannery, Mo., 173 S. W. 1053. Need not be technically accurate. Defend-
ant was arrested on a warrent issued upon a complaint which charged that he had
"willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, killed Olin Connell by striking him on the
head with his fist." The name of deceased was Olin McConnell. The defendant
was arrested and brought before the committing magistrate later in the same day on
which the crime was committed. He asked a postponement of the preliminary
examination, which was granted. Before the time fixed for that examination, he
appeared with counsel, waived examination, and was bound over for trial. An
information charging murder in the second degree was filed. He moved to quash
this because (1) no complaint had been filed charging a felony; (2) the name of the
deceased was not properly stated; (3) he had thus been deprived of a preliminary
examination. The motion was denied, he was indicted and convicted' of man-
slaughter, and appealed. Walker, J., held that (1) as complaints are ordinarily
made by laymen they need not conform to the rules of criminal pleading. This one
sufficiently charged manslaughter. (2) The defendant knew the nature of the charge,
the time when and the place where it was committed. The misnomer could not be
prejudicial. (3) He waived the right to a preliminary examination.
"Courts should not lend themselves to subterfugeg as defenses to criminal pro-
secution where not even an indication of prejudice is made. The time has passed,
not only in this state, but elsewhere when pure technicalities, in the absence of
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evidence of well defined injury to the accused will prevent the enforcement of the
criminal law."
The majority of the court appeared to think that if the defendant had insisted
upon a preliminary- examination, he should have been discharged at that examination
because of the defects in the complaint. But they concurred in the result reached
by Walker, J., on the ground that defendant had waived the defects in the complaint
by waiving the right to a preliminary examination. The judgment was affirmed.
CONSPIRACY.
United States v. Aczmel, 219 Fed. 917. Conspiracy affecting right to vote under
statute making senatorship subject to popular vote.
Under Const. Art. 1, sec. 2, providing that the House of Representatives shall
be composed of members chosen by the~people of the several states, and the electors
in each state shall have the qualifications of the electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislature, and Const. Amend. 17, making similar provisions as to United
States Senators, and Act June 4, 1914, providing for election of United States
Senators by direct vote of the people, the election to be conducted as near as may be
in accordance with the laws of the state regulating the nomination and election of
Representatives, the right to vote for Representatives in Congress and United
States Senators, and to serve as members of the election boards where such Repre-
sentative or Senator is to be elected, are rights secured by the constitution and laws
of the United States, within Criminal Code, sec. 19, making punishable a conspiracy
to deprive any citizen of any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution
and laws of the United States.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
State v. Pay, Utah, 146 Pac. 300. Preliminary examination. The state con-
stitution provided that offences "shall be prosecuted by information after examina-
tion and commitment by a magistrate," unless the accused waives examination.
A statute made it the duty of the district attorney, when a defendant had been ex-
a inned and committed, to file an information "charging the defendant with the
offence for which he is held to answer, or any other offence disclosed by the testimony,
whether it be the offence charged in the complaint on which the examination was
held or not." Defendant was examined on a complaint charging larceny of some
sheep. The magistrate held that the evidence did not show that larceny had been
committed but that the defendant had changed their ear marks with intent to steel
the sheep, and committed the defendant for trial upon the latter charge. The
district attorney filed an information pursuant to the commitment. The defendant
moved to quash it upon the ground that he was neither given nor had waived a
preliminary examination upon the charge made in the information. The motion was
denied and the defendant was tried, convicted, and he appealed. Held that the con-
stitution gave the defendant a right to a preliminary examination upon the charge
upon which he is committed for trial, and that there was not sufficient examination
in this case. Defendant is entitled to be informed of the charge at the hearing, and
to have the complaint read before he is called on to choose counsel to waive examina-
tion. When the state bound him over on a charge not contained in the complaint
he lostthe benefiit of counsel as well as the right to waive examination upon the charge
upon which he was actually committed. The magistrate should have had a new
complaint prepared charging the offence disclosed by the evidence and giving him an
opportunity to either waive or insist upon examination, and to procure counsel, if he
desired to do so. The defendant had not waived this right. The statute permitting
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the district attorney to file an information charging any other offence disclosed by
the testimony must be restricted to other offences included in the original complaint.
The judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to quash the
indictment, and, if the district judge is so advised, to direct the filing of a proper
complaint against the defendant, upon which the usual proceedings should be held.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.
People v. Ronsse, Cal., App., 146 Pac. 65. Before unauthorized person.
As the result of a preliminary examination defendant was bound over for trial in
the sfuperior court, on an information in legal form. After pleading not guilty
in the superior court defendant asked leave to withdraw his plea that he might
move to set the information aside. He presented no reasonable excuse for having
failed to make such a motion before filing his plea. The trial court denied his
request. At the trial he objected to the jurisdiction of the superior court because
the person who acted as justice of the peace and commiitted him for trial was not
a magistrate but was only a pretended incumbent of a pretended office. He made
the same objection after verdict. A statute provided that if a motion was not
made to set aside an information the defendant was precluded from afterward
raising any objection that was a ground for such motion. Held, that it was no
abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to permit him to withdraw his plea
and that as he had pleaded, the objection to the preliminary examination came
too late. The conviction was affirmed.
SECOND OFFENCE.
State v. Legg, 93 Atl. 556. Dela. Where second conviction is for an offence
prior to first conviction.
Accused, after being convicted of selling liquor to a minor, was again indicted
for a like offence. 'The sale charged by the second indictment occurred prior
to the sale for which accused was first convicted. Held, that she could not be
punished under Rev. Code 1915, sec. 165, prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors
and providing that a second conviction shall work a forfeiture of the license.
SUNDAY.
MAoss v. State, Tenn., 173 S. V. 859. Jury instructed. On a trial for murder
the argument of counsel was finished at 11:30 P. M. Saturday night. No formal
adjournment was taken but the sheriff was directed to bring the jury into court
the next morning, and the court took a recess. The court instructed the jury
Sunday morning and they returned a verdict apparently on Monday. The
defendant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life. His motion for
a new trial was overruled and he appealed. Held, that a canon of A. D. 517,
which forbade the adjudication of causes on Sunday was received and adopted by
the Saxon Kings of England, and confirmed by William the Conqueror and by
Henry II, thus becoming a part of the English common law. This rule became a
part of the common law of Tennessee and has not been changed by statute.
Under it ministerial acts may be done on Snnday but not judicial acts. Charging
the jury is a judicial function. Such error is not cured by the statute requiring
appellate courts to overlook mere irregularities and technical objections. The
conviction was reversed.
TRIAL.
Agee v, State, Ala., 67 So. 411. Separate trial, joint conviction. Agee and
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Kitchen were jointly indicted for murder. On motion they were granted separate
trials. At the day fixed for the trial of Agee, he was tried by a jury on a plea of
not guilty. The jury returned a verdict finding both Agee and Kitchen guilty
of murder in the first degree, and the court entered judgment pursuant to the
verdict. Both defendants appealed asking a reversal of judgment on the ground
that they were unlawfully tried jointly. Held, that as Kitchen had been convicted
without a trial the judgment must be reversed as to him. The gratuitous inter-
jection of Kitchen's name into the verdict and judgment could not prejudice Agee
so the judgment was affirmed as to him.
State v. Clary, La., 67 So. 376. Misconduct of Jury. On a trial for murder
the defendants were convicted of manslaughter. They appealed from the order
of the trial court denying a new trial on the ground that the jury was not kept free
from improper influences. The jury was kept together during the trial in charge of
two or more bailiffs. They were lodged at a hotel and at their meals were allowed
to converse freely with the waitresses, and could hear conversation at the other
tables. They were taken twice to moving picture shows with the permission of
the trial judge, and sat in the ordinary rows of chairs with the rows in front and
back of them occupied, in the obscurity which usually prevails in cases of that
kind. In going to and from the court room and these shows, they marched along
more or less crowed sidewalks. On one occasion a stranger conversed with one of
the jurors. Packages and valises were allowed to be given to them with but
slight examination of their contents, and a few notes were received by some of the
members. There was strong public sentiment against the defendants. The
appellate court were at first of the opinion that these facts vitiated the verdict.
"They were accessible, misconduct is presumed." On rehearing the jurors
testified that no improper influence was exercised upon them, and a majority of
the court thought the presumption of misconduct was fully answered by the
verdict being for manslaughter rather than for murder, and affirmed the conviction.
WHITE SLAVE ACT.
. Welsch v. United States, 220 Fed., 764. When transportation is for an immoral
purpose.
On trial for persuading and enticing a girl, with whom accused sustained
immoral relations, to go from one state to her home in another state for immoral
purposes, an instruction that if accused furnished the transportation to the girl
solely at the instance of the girl's aunt, because she wanted her to return home,
and if he was simply a messenger to convey that and furnish the transportation,
and had no other or further intent, he should be found not guilty, but that, if
he had the further purpose and intent after she was transported to her home
to renew sexual intercourse with her, he should be found guilty, was misleading,
if not erroneous, as the jury might have understood therefrom that accused was
guilty, however, free his words and acts from persuasion or inducement, if he had
the secret intention of profiting unlawfully by the girl's return home, especially
as the verdict acquitting accused of the charges of transporting and aiding in
transporting the girl, and convicting him of unlawful persuasion, was inconsistent
and indicated that the jury was confused as to the law.
Digg v. United States, 220 Fed. 545. Transportation for purposes *other
than commercialized vice.
The immorality denounced by the White Slave Traffic Act (Comp. St.,
1913, sec. 8813), prescribing the punishmant for knowingly transporting any woman
or girl in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or
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for any other immoral purpose, is not limited to commercialized vice, and the act
applies to transportation for the purpose of making a girl the concubine or mistresf
of the person transporting her.
Malloy v. South Carolina. 35 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 507. Substitution of electrocution
for -hanging after conviction. Ex post facto laws.
The change in the punishment for murder, made by S. Car. act Feb. 17, 1912,
from death by hanging within the county jail or its encloseure, in the presence of
specified witnesses, to electrocution within the penitentiary, in the presence of an
increased number of invited witnesses, does not render the statute repugnant to
U. S. Const. Art. 1, sec 10, as being ex post facto when applied to crimes previously
committed.
ENTRAPMENT.
State v. Dougherty, 93 Atl., 98 N. J. Accepting bribe to replace the Atlantic
City "Board Walk" with concrete.
Where, to discover municipal corruption, members of the city council were
offered bribes to pass an ordinance which was never intended to be carried out,
the councilmen having passed the ordinance and accepted tle bribes, cannot
defend in an indictment for conspiracy on the ground of entrapment.
ERROR WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Antrey v. State, Ala., 67 So. 237. Exclusion of evidence. On the trial of an
indictment for murder, the court excluded evidence of a statement made by the
deceased, which was offered by the defendant. Held, in the absence of a showing
that what the deceased said was in some way relevant to the issue of the case, the
exclusion of this question could not be pronounced erroneous.
People v. Walker, Cal. App., 146 Pac. 65. Confession corroborated by defen-
dant's testimony. On a trial foi murder the court admitted evidence of a so-called
confession by the defendant that he fired the shots which killed the deceased
but claimed that he was acting in self defence. At the trial he testified to the same
effect. Held, that while the record showed the alleged confession was not free
and voluntary, but was extorted by fear, intimidation and improper influence, the
error in admitting it was without prejudice to defendant's substantial rights,
as he made the same admission at the trial. Judgment of imprisonment for life
was affirmed.
EXPERT TESTIMONY.
People v. Risley, 108 N. E. 200 N. Y. Testimony of the mathematical
probabilities by a university professor.
In a prosecution for offering in evidence as genuine a document, knowing
that same had been Traudulently altered by the insertion of certain typewritten
words, a university professor was improperly permitted to testify that by the
application of the law of mathematics, the chance of the same defects, as were
shown by the inserted words, being produced by another typewriter, was so small
as practically to be a negative quanity, where his statement was not based on
actual observation but was purely speculative.
FALSE PRETENSES.
People v. Cronkrite. 107 N. E. 703 Illinois. Variance in indictment and proof.
On indictment charging that accused obtained from J. a large sum of money,
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goods and personal property, to wit, $400 lawful money of the United States
by means of a confidence game, was not supported by proof that accused obtained
from J. a check for $400, which he afterwards cashed, as he obtained no money
from J.
FORMER JEOPARDY.
State v. Rodgers, S. C., 84 S. E. 304. Two crimes in thie same transaction. The
evidence showed that the defendant, with others, went to the house of one Young.
The door was partly ajar and defendant shot Young, who fell from his chair to
the floor. He attempted to rise and defendant struck him on the head with an
axe. Defendant immediately turned his body over, removed some money from
his pocket, and then took a fire shovel and scattered coals of fire over and around
the body ahnd on the bed nearby, setting fire to the house, which burned down..
The defendant was tried and convicted of murder, and on a recommendation to
mercy, sentenced to the pententiary for life. Defendant was then indicted for
burning the dwelling house of said Young, convicted and sentenced to death. In
the trial for arson the state used practically the same witnesses as at the trial for
murder and the testimony was practically the same. After conviction defendant
moved in arrest of judgment (1) on the ground of former jeopardy (2) because the
same facts and testimony were used in both trials, (3) because a series of charges
shall not be preferred out of the same facts, (4) because the facts shown at the
first trial would have warranted and did sustain a conviction, on the indictment
for arson. Held, that as the defendant could not under any circumstances have
been convicted of arson in the trial under the indictment for murder, he had not
been in jeopardy for the offence of arson. The fact that he was undergoing
punishment for the crime of murder will not prevent execution of the sentence of
death for the crime of arson. The offences though arising out of the same state
of facts were separate and distinct.
It was further objected that there was no testimony proving that the defendant
burned the dwelling house of Young, because Young was dead when the arson was
committed. Held, that there was no error in overruling this objection as the
evidence did not show that Young had died from his injuries when the defendant
set fire to the house.
Schulman v. State, Tex., Crim. App., 173 S. W. 1195. Waiver of jury trial.
Defendant ivas on trial for a misdemeanor. After three witnesses had been ex-
amined, a juror was excused because his child was sick, defendant's counsel agreeing
that they would try the case before the remaining five jurors. The court announced
that he would discharge the rest of the jurors, and did so in spite of defendant's
objection. Later he was put on trial before another jury, his plea of former jeopardy
was not even submitted to the jury, and he was convicted and appealed. Held,
that while the state cannot waive a juror the defendant can, and has the right
to agree to a trial by less than six jurors. Defendant was in jeopardy under these
facts, and could not be retired. The conviction was reversed.
People ex rel. Bullock v. Hayes, Warden, 151 N. Y., Supp. 1075. Where
the relator was tried under an indictment for manslaughter and the jury disagreed,
being discharged without his consent, though also without objection, and he was
indicted on the same facts for murder the second indictment is valid, and he may
be tried on it, since where the court lacks jurisdiction, or the indictment is too
defective to support a conviction, or the jury is discharged without a verdict,
after disagreement continued during reasonable time for deliberation, there is no
former jeopardy that may be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution.
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INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
Day v. Comrnenwealth, Ky,, App., 173 S. W. 136. Limits fixed by jury.
The indeterminate sentence law required the jury to state in their verdict the
minimum and maximum limits of the term of imprisonment. Defendant was
convicted of manslaughter and the jury, under an instruction that they should
fix his penalty by imprisonment for a term of not less than two or more than twenty-
one years, fixed it at twenty-one years, without fixing any minimum term. Held,
that the instruction and the verdict were erroneous as the verdict did not conform
to the statute. The judgment was reversed and a new trial granted.
Orange v. State, Tex., Crim. App., 173 S. W. 297. Limits fixed by statute-
The defendant was convicted of murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment in the
penitentiary. Under the indeterminate sentence law and the statute fixing the
penalty for murder, the sentence should have been for not less than five years nor
longer than his natural life. On appeal from the conviction, the appellate court
ordered the judgment to be reformed to conform to the statute. Affirmed.
INTERSTATE EXTRADITION.
Ex parle Innes, Tex., Crim. App., 173 S. W. 291. Involuntary presence in the
state. The relator went from Georgia to Oregon. There she was arrested and
sent to Texas, upon the requisition of the governor of that state for trial upon a
criminal charge. She was acquitted. While she was in jail in Texas, during the
proceedings, the governor of Texas granted a requisition from the governor of
Georgia. Upon her acquittal she was immediately arrested upon the requisition.
A writ of habeas corpus was sued out and the court ordered heP turned over to the
Georgia authorities. She appealed. It was argued that the provision in the
Federal Constitution that a person "who shall flee from justice and be found in
another state," shall be delivered up, is not self executing. The Federal statute
giving effect to this provision makes it the duty of the executive authorties of the
state "to which such person has fled" to cause him to be arrested. If the defend-
ant had not gone to Texas voluntarily that was not the state "to which she had
fled," and the governor of that state had no authority to have her arrested under
the requisition without first giving her an opportunity to leave the state. Held,
that by analogy to the rule that a person extradited from another state for trial
upon one charge may be tried upon a different charge, the relator could be legally
surrendered to the Georgia authorities, under the Federal law. But the state of
Texas had power to provide for extradition within its limits in cases not covered
by the act of congress. The state statute provided for the extradition of a fugitive
who should "be found in this state." The Georgia authorities found the relator
in Texas, and hence the state statute applied. Judgment affirmed.
LARCENY.
Komito v. State, 107 N. E. 762, Ohio. Sale by custodian. Where goods
are in the possession of the lawful owner, and a mere custodian, "storekeeper,"
or watchman takes them and removes them from the premises wrongfully, and sells
the same without authority, such custodian, "storekeeper," or watchman is
guilty of larceny, and any one receiving such goods, with full knowledge of the
circumstances, is guilty of knowingly receiving stolen goods. The court salid:
"Courts sometimes indulge in an ethereal refinement between larceny and embezzle-
ment that in practical operation very often nullifies the statutes. The only
benefit accruing from such a policy results in the rather doubtful advantage of the
criminal escaping his just punishment."
